• Protection of policyholders interests mainly through the protective function of the solvency regulation (protection of the institution insurance)
• Reduction of the insurer's ruin probability to a very low but still positive level 
Starting position Implications
Structure of insurance guaranty schemes
Exemplary illustration
In this example:
• Insurance company pays premium to guaranty fund
• Ex-ante payment to fund
• Fund contribution is percentage of policyholders' premium P 0
Determination of fund contribution is critical for incentives
• Only a few E.U. member states have one or more insurance guaranty schemes in place
• Lack of harmonization in this area may hinder effective and equal consumer protection. This may lead to a loss of consumer confidence in the relevant markets and may ultimately put at risk market stability. It may also impede the functioning of the internal insurance market by distorting crossborder competition
• In the banking and the securities sectors specific directives on guarantee schemes have been adopted since 1994
• Recent financial turmoil has made people far more aware of the existence and limits of consumer protection/guarantee schemes in all financial sectors • Why introduction?
• Discussion boosted due to financial crisis
Adverse incentives
• Effects of ex-post premiums
• Non-risk-adequate ex-ante premiums
• Basically danger of wealth transfers among insureds of different insurance companies 
Yes No
• In the literature / in the current E.U. debate the need for risk-adequate fund contributions is often expressed
• This is intended to counteract the negative effects of information asymmetries in insurance markets
• It can be shown that a risk-adequate (source-related) premium assessment is only truly possible in arbitrage-free markets (option pricing framework)
• As far as the guaranty fund stands for diversification of risks, the determination of a risk-adequate (i.e., source-related and arbitrary free) premium is not possible
• This is due to the fundamental problem of the allocation of (unsystematic) diversification effects
• Capital transfers between firms are inevitable Do risk-adequate fund contributions assure advantageousness? -If yes, for whom?
Is an IGS beneficial for policyholders, for the insurance company / equity holders, or for the guaranty scheme (state, tax payers)? Safer companies should pay c.p. lower premiums in the IGSin a volume-based system this can be reversed!
